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OUN—Between Collaboration and Confrontation with Nazi Germany

In a way of introduction to the topic of nationalism I would like to state that nationalism, which has been characterized by some as source of evil justifying criminal behavior, for others as a source of salvation, is in fact an ideology perceived differently by different people depending what role it plays in their national life. For some it serves as a vehicle of oppression while for others it became a clarion call for liberation, even at the cost of one's own life. Stated briefly one can say that nationalism is the product of historical development of society which, after the period of Enlightenment in the 18th century and the Era of Romanticism established nationalism as the dominant ideology of the Western World incorporating into its program such elements as common language, culture, tradition, a cult of ancestors and a common economic, political and sometimes religious experiences. Ultimately it became a dominant ideology of the world. Ukrainian nationalism is but a variation of it.

The objective of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists to win for the Ukrainian people freedom and independence was clearly pronounced in the founding conference of the OUN in 1929. As can be easily understood, the path toward the achievement of that goal was a difficult one given the fact that the Ukrainian territory was occupied by foreign states, particularly by the Soviet Union in the East and by Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia in the West. To mobilize support for their cause, the OUN adopted the ideology of integral nationalism whose ideas were a moving force in the 1920's and 1930's. The Ukrainian variant of that ideology, which was closest to the French integral nationalism, proved very successful in mobilizing the youth of Western Ukraine for the struggle for independence. Indeed, one could argue that the OUN was a radicalized version of the earlier national aspirations whose central, indeed, the only objective was to serve the Ukrainian nation fighting for its freedom and independence. Everything else was secondary, including the nature of the future state that they hoped to create. As we read the programs of the OUN we discover that besides freedom and independence, as the central objective, the OUN was equally concerned with attaining social and economic freedom for the people of Ukraine. These were the ideals that mobilized large segments of population, particularly the youth of western Ukraine¹.

As a living organized force the OUN, particularly its program, was not "written in stone". On the contrary, it was an evolving revolutionary organism seeking new ways to achieve its objectives. This was particularly true of the leadership, who, imitating the success of the totalitarian systems, orientated OUN in the direction of authoritarian theory and practice. This became particularly obvious after the assassination of Evhen Konovalets in 1938 when OUN acquired characteristic of a unitary political party under the unquestioned authority of a leader. To some people, these and several other characteristics of the OUN program and organizational structure suggested that the OUN was a fascist organization, a characterization that the OUN rejected explaining the differences between them.² In his book, Alexander Motyl reinforces the arguments of the OUN leadership explaining that for the fascists the state is the beginning and the end of all things. Indeed, for fascism there is no nation without a state. For the OUN, on the other hand, it was just the opposite. "The nation," claimed the OUN, "is the highest form of organic human community...." Moreover, "the Ukrainian Nation is the starting point of every action and the end goal of every striving of Ukrainian nationalism." Professor Motyl states it succinctly : Fascism was a way of **organizing** a state, while Ukrainian Nationalism was a way of **attaining** a state. The Ukrainians, therefore, could not be fascists, because they had not even reached that point – a state – which made fascism possible.... In other words, Ukrainian Nationalism was in essence a national liberation movement."³

The OUN found little sympathy for its objectives among the European states. The exception was the Lithuanian Government, which, according to the British report, provided the OUN leadership with

“constant money subventions, issuing to them false passports, facilitating their voyages under fictitious names for agitation campaigns to America and by giving hospitality in Kovno to the publication of U.W.O –*Surma*⁴. The OUN members referred Lithuania by their code name which was Kazan’. The document also emphasizes that Czechoslovakia was, if not supportive, then at least tolerant to a significant number of leading members of the OUN, who lived and were active on its territory.⁵

One of the states to which the OUN displayed interest, as a source of possible support, was Germany. At the same time, the post-Versailles Germany used Germans, who were connected with Galician struggle for independence in 1918-1921, as a source of information about the internal affairs in Poland, the attitude toward Poland of the Galician Ukrainians, and in the Soviet Union. Gerhard von Mende, a high official in the Nazi apparatus and specialist in East European affairs, mentions Col. Alfred Bisanz, Prof. Hans Koch, Severin Beigert and Joseph Mueller. According to von Mende, Bisanz was the principal contact man between the German intelligence and the OUN. As far as any participation of the OUN in the German intelligence is concerned, von Mende merely mentions that Col. Evhen Konovalts had contacts with some officers of the German intelligence, but, practically, that did not mean anything because the main office of the German Security Service did not even have a separate program dealing with Ukraine. For them, writes Professor von Mende, “the Ukrainian question as a political factor was not yet recognized”. The situation changed in 1938 as a result of the growing tensions between Poland and Germany.⁶

After the assassination of Col. Evhen Konovalts by a Soviet agent, the leadership passed into the hands of Andrii Melnyk, who was favorably inclined toward working together with the German intelligence service expecting German assistance in achieving OUN’s political objectives. The initiative for some sort of collaboration came from German intelligence, who began discussions not only with the OUN representatives, but also with influential Ukrainian individuals. Thus, for example, Colonel Bisanz and some other intelligence officers met in July 1939 with Dmytro Palijiv and Mykhailo Khronoviat in Serszec where they discussed a possible role of Ukrainians in a possible Polish-German conflict.⁷ As a result of the meetings with the leadership of the OUN, the Abwehr, that is, military intelligence, organized anywhere from 200 to 600 men, who began to train in August 1939 using a code name “Bergbauerhilfe” (BBH). The unit, commanded by Colonel Roman Sushko, actually did not participate in any military operation because as soon as the Soviets invaded Poland the Abwehr ordered that the Ukrainian unit not go beyond the Sian River in order not to confront the Soviet troops, an act which would have violated the German-Soviet Agreement of August 23, 1939.⁸ The Ukrainians took this Nazi-Soviet agreement concerning Ukraine as a betrayal and an insult to their national dignity, an act, which resembled the German approval of the Hungarian invasion of the Carpathian Ukraine on March 15, 1939.⁹ Shortly thereafter the unit was disbanded – thus ended the first act of OUN – German collaboration.

For the sake of clarity it should be noted that in 1939, 1940 and 1941 it was not something unusual for a liberation movement like OUN to seek support from a country as powerful as Germany. Many countries, including the United States, maintained diplomatic relations with Germany until on December 11, 1941 when Germany declared war on the United States. Certainly a real collaborator of Nazi Germany was the Soviet Union, which signed the Ribbentrop – Molotov Agreement on August 23, 1939, giving thereby to Hitler a free hand against Poland and in the rest of Western Europe while Stalin sent the Red Army to occupy the eastern provinces of Poland and then the Baltic countries also declaring war on Finland. This Nazi-Soviet Pact, more than any other act, unleashed the tragedy of World War II. That collaboration lasted until June 22, 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

The frustration experienced by the Ukrainians as a result of the failure in the struggle for independence of the Carpathian Ukraine and the unexpected turn of events as a result of the German-Soviet

Agreement escalated the growing conflict between Andrii Melnyk, his close associates on the one hand and Stepan Bandera, who just came out of the Polish jail, and his following, on the other. The schism within the OUN occurred already in February 1940 when the leadership of the Bandera faction was established and Bandera was chosen as its leader. The split was formalized when in April 1941 the Bandera faction called the Second Congress of the OUN, which defined its plans and policies.¹⁰ Thus Ukrainians found themselves with two distinct organizations, which pursued the same central objective – Independent Ukraine, but which differed in their strategies. Only now they were known as OUN-M, under the leadership of Melnyk and OUN-B, under the leadership of Bandera. Unfortunately, they were unable to reconcile their differences despite the efforts of the German Abwehr to act as intermediaries.¹¹ All this was happening when the Germans were already preparing their plans for war against the Soviet Union in which they hoped to use the services of a unified OUN.

While fighting among themselves, the OUN-M and OUN-B, having contacts with the Abwehr, began, with the blessing and support of Abwehr, to organize in the Spring of 1941 groups of men, who were to be trained secretly for special operations. A man, who played a very active role in organizing the followers of Bandera for military training, was a member of the leadership of the OUN-B who, unbeknown to them, was for years an agent of the German intelligence – his name was Riko Yary.¹² As could have been expected, the Germans and the Ukrainians, who formed Nachtigall and Roland battalions, which were trained secretly in Neuhammer (Germany) and in Saubersdorf (Austria), had different objectives in forming these battalions. The Ukrainians, who were members of the OUN, had only one objective in joining the military units – to serve the Ukrainian cause. To be certain that their objective in joining these battalions would not be misinterpreted, the Ukrainians put forth the conditions that the members of the two battalions “would not have to take an oath either to the Führer or to Germany, but rather to Ukraine and the OUN “.¹³

To make certain that the German authorities understood the reason for the Ukrainian willingness to participate in their plans, both factions of the OUN addressed their objectives to Hitler and other high officials. In a Memorandum of April 14, 1941 the leadership of OUN-M, in the very first sentence state that “the goal of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) is the reestablishment of an independent, sovereign Ukrainian State in the territory between the Danube, Carpathian Mts., and the Caspian Sea, which is inhabited by the Ukrainian people”.¹⁴ The Bandera’s faction of the OUN (henceforth OUN-B), held its Second Congress at the end of May 1941 and adopted resolutions among which one states that “only completely Sovereign Ukrainian State can secure for the Ukrainian people free life and a complete and multifaceted development of its people”.¹⁵ A month later, on June 23rd, the OUN sent an extensive 14-page Memorandum to Hitler, signed by Stepan Bandera and Wolodymyr Stachiw, addressing numerous issues, but the central theme of the Memorandum was to emphasize that the central objective of the OUN was the renewal of an Independent Ukrainian State, which is mentioned at least once on seven different pages.¹⁶ The Memorandum included also a warning, indeed a threat, that while “the German troops entering Ukraine will be, of course, greeted at first as liberators, but this attitude can soon change, in case Germany comes into Ukraine without appropriate promises of [her] goal to re-establish the Ukrainian State”.¹⁷ The Memorandum ends with a very powerful note stating that “a Ukrainian is strongly determined to create conditions which will guarantee a national development in an independent state. Each power, which pursues its own interests of building a new order in the East-European space, must take into account this resolution”.¹⁸ To some German officials and intellectuals it was obvious that the Ukrainians “were ready to join Germany in order to gain their national freedom. They saw the opportunity, which has arrived to realize their dream of an independent Ukrainian State free from Poland and Russia. The entire society is unified in this desire”.¹⁹

The German authorities received those documents from the Ukrainians, analyzed their meaning,²⁰ but did not respond forcing Ukrainians to seek their own solutions. They did not respond because they did

not want to antagonize the Ukrainians whose human resources they wanted to exploit for their own purposes, which were totally contrary to the Ukrainian objectives. “Hitler”, wrote Herwarth, “saw in Ukraine, as in other occupied territories of the Soviet Union, purely an object of colonial exploitation”.²¹ Hitler’s ideas were reflected in the attitudes of the entire state apparatus and in the policies employed in Ukraine. Indeed, for the Germans, Ukrainians were no partners.²² Despite the uncertainty, the Ukrainians in the Nachtigall battalion, “hoping against hope”, were with the German Wehrmacht at the border when the war against the Soviet Union began on June 22, 1941. They were among the first units to have entered the city of Lviv in the morning on June 30th. After one-week stay in Lviv, Nachtigall left for the battlefields fighting against the Red Army until they reached Vinnytsia. Roland battalion started its participation in the war a bit later—it operated along the southern front. They crossed Hungary, went into Romania and finally reached Ukraine where they established contacts with some of the OUN “marching groups”. Thus Ukrainians were performing duties expected of them by the Germans. Ukrainians, uncertain about the future, decided to prepare themselves for the unknown. At the initiative of OUN-B, 86 distinguished individuals, holding different political views, with the exception of the followers of Melnyk, met on June 22nd in Krakow and, after lengthy discussions, established the Ukrainian National Committee. The individuals chosen to be responsible for the activities of the Committee were: General Vsevolod Petriv (President), Dr. Volodymyr Horbovy (First Vice-President), Prof. Viktor Andrievsky (Second Vice-President), Dr. Stepan Shukhevych (First Secretary) and the former Deputy-Marshall of the Polish Parliament, Vasyl Mudry (Second Secretary).²³ On the same day the Committee wrote an Appeal to the Ukrainian people, signed by 36 distinguished civic, cultural and political leaders, calling them to unite for a common struggle for the creation of the Ukrainian state.²⁴ That did not move Col. Andriy Melnyk who expressed a harsh criticism against individuals who created the Committee.²⁵

Following the advance of the German Army, the OUN, followers of both, Bandera and Melnyk, sent political action groups, known as “marching groups” into the Eastern regions of Ukraine whose duty was to help organize local administration and police and inculcate a spirit of civic independence into their activity. As soon as the German army began to advance, Jaroslaw Stecko, the 1st Deputy of Bandera, prepared to cross the former Soviet-German border in order to be in Lviv as soon as the German troops entered the city. He was authorized by the OUN to perform what amounted to a *fait accompli*, an act which would challenge Hitler’s plan for Ukraine. This historical event, known as the National Assembly, took place on June 30, 1941 in the Prosvita building where some one hundred distinguished individuals of Lviv gathered not knowing that they would participate in a historical act that will change the relationship between the would be friendly power, Germany, and the Ukrainian people who were fighting for their freedom, for their Independent State.²⁶ While the meeting was in progress, two German officers, Professor Hans Koch and Major zu Euckern, entered the auditorium, who, however, refused Stetzko’s invitation to sit at the guests’ table. Professor Koch, who was specialist in Ukrainian affairs for the German Army, asked to speak in order to state his position. His comment was negative concerning the proclamation of the Ukrainian State – he stated that Germany “does not intend to tolerate some new state creations on the territory conquered by the blood of her soldiers”. He demanded that the Assembly be cancelled. As he was leaving the gathering, Koch approached Stetzko and told him – “you are playing with fire”.²⁷

What the Germans were told for some time by the OUN leadership, Stetzko proclaimed formally in The Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State on June 30, 1941. It stated:
By the will of the Ukrainian People, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera proclaims the restoration of the Ukrainian State, for which entire generations of the best sons of Ukraine have sacrificed their lives.
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which under the direction of its creator and leader Evhen Konovalets, during the past decades of bloody Muscovite—Bolshevik subjugation carried a stubborn

fight for freedom, calls upon the entire Ukrainian people not to lay down their arms as long as an independent Ukraine is not established on the entire territory of Ukraine.

The Sovereign Ukrainian Government will guarantee the Ukrainian people law and order, multifaceted development of its abilities and a satisfaction of all its needs.

In the western territories of Ukraine is being created a Ukrainian government, which will be subordinated to a Ukrainian National Government, which will be created at the will of the Ukrainian people in the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv.

3. The renewed Ukrainian State will cooperate closely with National-Socialist Greater-Germany, which under the leadership of Adolf Hitler is creating a new order in Europe and the world and is helping the Ukrainian nation liberate itself from the Muscovite occupation.

The Ukrainian National—Revolutionary Army, which will be created on Ukrainian land, will continue to fight together with the allied German army against the Muscovite occupation, for a Sovereign Unified Ukrainian State and for new order in the entire world.

Long live the Sovereign Unified Ukrainian State!

Long live the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists!

*Long live the Leader Of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Stepan Bandera!*²⁸

Lviv, 30 June 1941, 9 p.m.

Yaroslav Stetzko

Chairman of the National Assembly

The Proclamation was immediately read over the radio creating a great enthusiasm among the people of West Ukraine. On the next day Metropolitan Sheptytsky issued a Pastoral Letter blessing the historical event expressing hope that the new government under the leadership of Yaroslav Stetsko will fulfill “the needs and wellbeing all citizens inhabiting Our Country irrespective of their religious beliefs, nationality and social status”.²⁹ Encouraged by the enthusiastic popular support of the Declaration of Independence, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote a letter to Andriy Melnyk on July 7th urging him to reach an understanding with Bandera, which would serve the best interest of the Ukrainian people. That request was never realized.

Berlin was surprised by this courageous move of the OUN-B and therefore took immediate steps to terminate the very idea of self-rule, to say nothing proclaiming a Sovereign Independent Ukraine. In his letter to A. Rosenberg, Erich Koch stated that the Proclamation in Lviv on June 30th contradicted “Hitler’s planned colonialism in the East and instead elevated to a sustainable principle self-determination of nations”.³⁰ The German security police (SD) understood quite well the significance of the events in Lviv. In their report of July 3, 1941, they informed Berlin that through the proclamation of Ukrainian state and through the organization of militia the Bandera’s leadership tries to “present the German authorities with *fait accompli*”.³¹ German position was made clear during a conversation between Stepan Bandera, Dr. Horbovyi, Mudryi, Dr. Shukhevych and Andrievskyi, on the one side and Undersecretary of State Ernst Kundt, Dr. Föhl, Judge von Bülow and Colonel Bisanz on the other. Before the conversation with Bandera started Kundt pointed out that in any discussion between Germans and Ukrainians only the German point of view was decisive. Bandera was not moved by the categorical statement of Kundt and explained that the struggle in which the Ukrainians are engaged is the struggle for free and independent Ukraine.³² State secretary Kundt was pressing the point that the German authorities alone have the right to make political decisions in Ukraine. Bandera responded that “the basis for a full cooperation with the German institutions was the goal for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state...”³³ Kundt tried to explain that no reasonable man would make decisions without an agreement with the appropriate authority.³⁴ To which Bandera responded: “I wish once again to clarify that for all the orders that I have given, I did not depend for any order nor

for an understanding of any German authority. In all of the orders given by me I did not rely on any German authority or any consent of German authorities, but only on the mandate that I have received from the Ukrainian people...³⁵ Kundt responded that “only Adolf Hitler can determine what will happen there”.³⁶ The die was cast, both parties made their positions irrevocably clear. The German plans for Eastern Europe precluded the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, while the OUN could not compromise on this issue without losing the very purpose for its existence.

The new political realities were reflected in the activities of the OUN-B as it was documented in the German police reports. Already on July 2, 1941, the police report stated that the Bandera followers are organizing militia and town administration³⁷ in order to place the German authorities before accomplished facts.³⁸ In response, the German Security Police began to arrest leading Ukrainian nationalists. The report of July 5, 1941, informs about Stepan Bandera being taken to Berlin for interrogation. On July 7th, he is already reported to be in “honorary” imprisonment.³⁹ Besides Bandera several other leading individuals were arrested in Krakow and in Lviv. The Germans still stayed in touch with Stetsko trying to convince him to annul the Proclamation of June 30th. For the Germans it was a *sine qua non* condition as it was reiterated by Professor Hans Koch on July 10th during his conversation with Kundt, Dr. Föhl and von Bülow when he stated that “there is no Ukrainian government. He could consider only a friendly Ukrainian people, but not an allied Ukrainian state”.⁴⁰ Anticipating the possibility of arrests in Lviv, the leadership of the OUN-B held a meeting on July 10th attended by Yaroslav Stesko, Mykola Lebed, Yaroslav Starukh, Klymiv-Legenda, Lev Rebet, Ivan Ravlyk, Vasyl Turkovsky and Roman Ilnytsky at which the future activity of the OUN-B was discussed. To make certain that the organization would not become leaderless, Stetsko designated Mykola Lebed as the leader of the organization. It was decided at the meeting to recast the structure of the OUN-B in order to make it ready for the struggle against Germany as an occupying country.⁴¹ As anticipated, on July 11th Stetsko and Ilnytsky were arrested and the next day they were sent to Berlin where they, as Bandera, were placed under house arrest during the interrogation period.⁴² During that time Bandera and Stetsko had access to outside communication, which explains their ability to issue political statements in the form of declarations or explanations. On July 21, 1941, for example, the Political Department of the OUN-B issued a statement explaining the significance and unchangeable character of the Proclamation of the Renewal of the Independent Ukrainian State on June 30th. The document stated that the Ukrainian people will consider the blow against the Ukrainian Government as a hostile act of Germany against the Ukrainian state-idea concluding that “the Proclamation of the Ukrainian State in Lviv is a tested and accomplished reality. From that time on all acts will be done in the name of the Ukrainian State”.⁴³

Besides the arrests of the leading members of the OUN-B, which created throughout the country a certain consternation, as is reported by the security police,⁴⁴ a new element of concern emerged when the German authorities began to discuss plans for merging Western Ukraine (Galicia) with the General Government. The first to react was the Council of Seniors, which discussed this issue on July 22 and 23 and concluded by drafting a statement of protest addressed to the German authorities.⁴⁵ This merger, says the report, caused a considerable distress in Galicia. The merger took place amidst celebrations of the German party members, police and military luminaries on August 1, 1941, but even then some documents indicate that the transition would not be an easy one.⁴⁶ The government even issued a special secret instruction “How to treat the Ukrainians”. Should, for example, the Ukrainians complain about joining separate provinces to either General Government or to Romania one should simply answer that “Ukraine was saved with German blood and therefore Germany has the right to decide about the provinces according to the general political necessity”.⁴⁷ When Yaroslav Stetsko learned about the merger of Galicia with General Government, he, though although under house arrest in Berlin, sent on August 3rd a letter of protest to Hitler on behalf of the Ukrainian Government stating that the Ukrainian people, who for centuries fought for an Independent Ukrainian State, are surprised and shocked by this act of incorporation.⁴⁸

The leadership of Nachtigall and Roland, the Ukrainian military units within the German military, reacted immediately, upon learning about the German policy of arrests and incorporation of Galicia into the General Government. Captain Roman Shukhevych, a recognized political leader of the battalion, wrote a letter to the high command of the German Wehrmacht protesting the developments in Galicia stating that under these circumstances the Ukrainian battalion cannot remain in the German army. In response, both battalions were withdrawn from the front line in order “to undergo additional training” and in September they were transferred to Frankfurt an der Oder where they were given a choice either to be sent to Germany as forced laborers or to serve as Schutzpolizei in Belorus for one year. They chose the latter. Thus ended the hoped for military collaboration of Ukrainian nationalists with Abwehr, who opposed the establishment of an Independent Ukraine.⁴⁹

The German authorities were rather tolerant toward Bandera and Stetsko during their house arrest in Berlin – they could meet with their friends and issue statements to the German government. The Germans hoped that they might still change their mind and reject the Proclamation of June 30, 1941. After two months, however, they concluded that Bandera and Stetsko would not change their mind on this important issue, as was proven on August 14, 1941 by the “Memorandum of the OUN Concerning German Demands to Dissolve the Ukrainian Government”. The Memorandum was a reply to the German conditions for a limited political activity of the OUN, which were presented to the OUN leadership by Dr. Koch and Dr. von Mende on August 6th. The central point of the German demands was dissolution of the Ukrainian Government, which was created in Lviv on June 30, 1941. In its memorandum to the German authorities the OUN-B stated unequivocally that it could not reject the proclamation of June 30th without rejecting its entire revolutionary tradition whose central objective always was the re-establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. “*The OUN*”, stated the Memorandum, “*desires to cooperate with Germany not out of opportunism, but from a realization of the necessity of this cooperation for the well-being of Ukraine*”.⁵⁰ Somewhat similar offer was made by representatives of the German intelligence to Mykola Lebed, who was designated by Stetsko as the acting head of the OUN-B in Ukraine. Hans Koch, Werner Markert, Ernst zu Euckern and an unidentified major, invited Lebed for talks during which they asked that Lebed, as a deputy of Bandera, to abrogate the Proclamation of the Ukrainian state. As a reward they offered to hand over to the OUN-B the administration of Galicia. Lebed’s rejection of their proposal terminated the discussion after which Lebed was told that his safe-conduct was good only for eight hours.⁵¹

Unable to pressure Bandera and Stetsko to renounce the Proclamation of June 30th, the German police transferred them on September 15 to the Berlin main jail on Alexanderplatz and in January 1942 they were sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where they stayed until the Fall 1944. Concurrently the German security forces also launched a dragnet which resulted in imprisonment of hundreds of Bandera’s followers. Most of those arrested were sent to concentration camps, while others were executed.⁵² The German security services were particularly interested in capturing Mykola Lebed and toward that end, on October 4, 1941, they issued an “all points bulletin” (for police use only) with Lebed’s picture warning that he was armed. It should be noted that the OUN-B leadership anticipated the German radical measures and therefore, already on July 10, 1941, a meeting was held where, among other things, even the possibility of an uprising against the Germans was discussed. The idea was rejected as unrealistic until the Ukrainian people were prepared for it organizationally and psychologically. The gathering decided to reorganize the OUN-B with the purpose of undertaking intensive preparations for an armed struggle against Germany. Roman Ilnytsky, who was present at the gathering, observed that this was the first resolution of the OUN-B directed against Nazi Germany.⁵³ What followed was an escalation of the OUN-B activities against the German authorities, as was reported by the German security services. Indeed, the report of August 27, 1941, quotes the almost prophetic warning the OUN-B made to Hitler in its Memorandum of June 23, 1941, which stated: “The German troops entering Ukraine will be, of course, greeted as liberators,

but this attitude can soon change if Germany comes into Ukraine without appropriate goal and promises to re-establish the Ukrainian State”.⁵⁴ The reports of the German security services of August 22 and 27, 1941 prove that the prediction of the OUN leadership was correct. At first the German troops were greeted by the Ukrainian population, but things changed when the Germans proved that they did not come to liberate the Ukrainian nation. One report quotes leaflets and signs on buildings saying: “Down with foreign rule! Long live Stepan Bandera”. Another report states that “the desire for independence is manifesting itself more and more, as well as the determination to be free from German influence”.⁵⁵

As the spirit of opposition and Nazi oppression escalated, the OUN-B, under the leadership of Mykola Lebed, held its first important Conference in September 1941 where the political objectives, emphasizing the need to publish materials which would educate the population in the spirit of political awareness were clearly stated. A particular emphasis was placed on propaganda which would unmask the German plans for the exploitation and colonization of Ukraine. This propaganda was viewed as a preparatory period for an active struggle against the Germans.⁵⁶ The decisions reached at the Conference amounted to a declaration of war against Germany. Taking this position was not an easy matter, as the masses still tended to view the Germans as liberators from the Soviet nightmare. Therefore it was necessary to prepare the people psychologically for the inevitable confrontation with the Nazis. With that purpose in mind the OUN-B held its Second Conference In April 1942 where the question of Ukrainian political aspirations was addressed, stating unequivocally that the objective of the OUN-B was the establishment of a Sovereign Ukrainian State.⁵⁷ Declaring the war to be fought in the interest of imperial states – Germany and the USSR, the Conference stated: *As an [alternative] to the Bolshevik ideology of internationalism and the German vision of the so-called “New Europe”, we propose an international concept of a just national, political,[and] economic reconstruction of Europe based on the principle of free national states under the slogan “Freedom for the Nations and for the Individual”*⁵⁸.

The Germans hoped to suppress these initiatives by extreme measures of violence and executions. Thus, for example, a special instruction was issued to the Security Police in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Rivne, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia concerning the “Bandera Movement”. The instruction stated that “it has been established with certainty that the Bandera Movement is preparing in the Reichskommissariat an uprising whose ultimate objective is to create independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera-Movement are to be immediately arrested and, after a thorough interrogation secretly liquidated as thieves.”⁵⁹

While the Germans paid greater attention to the activities of Bandera followers, whom they considered more dangerous to their policies in Ukraine, it was inevitable that at some point they would also undertake repressive measures against Melnyk followers, whose program, like that of OUN-B, called for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state – this Berlin ordered the local authorities to prevent at all costs.⁶⁰ The local authorities seem to have read the instruction to mean that any expression of national sentiment with political overtones should be suppressed. Thus after commemorative ceremonies at Bazar, which attracted thousands of people, the German police instituted an inquiry, which led to the arrest and execution of some 20 OUN-M members. Among them was one member of the executive body of the organization.⁶¹

The OUN-M suffered its greatest losses, in terms of its leadership, in Kyiv where it concentrated its main efforts. Although they did not proclaim the Ukrainian state, as they were hoping to do, they did succeed in organizing the Ukrainian National Council headed by Professor Mykola Velychivsky, which, they hoped, would develop into a representative political institution in Eastern Ukraine. Col. Andrii Melnyk and his followers were wrong expecting benevolent attitude of the Nazis toward their objective of proclaiming a Ukrainian state. The repressive measures of the German security police

against various members of the National Council, including the arrest of Professor Velychkevsky, brought this body to a speedy end.⁶² However, in the short period of its existence the Ukrainian Council not only succeeded in stimulating some civic activity, but reacting to the increasing German violence, it drafted a Memorandum to Hitler on January 14, 1942, which not only reflected the disappointments of the Ukrainian people with the German rule, but also betrayed a sense of frustration of the OUN-M with the German policies in general.⁶³

These frustrations with the Germans were based on some bitter experiences the OUN-M had since November 1941. On December 12, 1941 the Security Police seized the highly successful newspaper *Ukrainske Slovo* and arrested Oleh Kandyby, Ivan Rohach, Yaroslav Chemerynsky and Petro Oliynyk, who were leading individuals in the OUN-M organization.⁶⁴ After these arrests the *Ukrainske Slovo* was discontinued. In February 1942 Gestapo dealt a death-blow to the literary circle, which published a literary journal *Litavry*, whose guiding spirit was the poetess Olena Teliha. They were arrested and altogether some forty persons were executed.⁶⁵ In response to these brutal methods of the German security police against the OUN members throughout the Ukraine a conference was called in Pochaiv on May 24 – 25, 1942, where, according to Jaroslaw Hajwas, a participant in the conference, the gathering condemned the German colonial exploitation of Ukraine adopting the position that OUN-M should actively fight against the German rule for, next to the Bolsheviks, Hitler's Germany was Ukraine's worst enemy. Political position of the OUN-M was articulated by the first speaker of the Conference, Bystryi, who stated that Ukrainian policy toward the Germans "should be a response from our side to the German policy in Ukraine. That policy is not only of colonial exploitation, but also of colonial extermination of the Ukrainian people."⁶⁶ The position taken by the Conference, though not popular with all members of the organization and somewhat questioned by Melnyk himself,⁶⁷ seems to have predetermined the basic policy of the OUN-M for the duration of the war.

The decisions of the conferences of both factions of the OUN were vigorously disseminated in various underground publications, which appeared as journals, bulletins and leaflets, a fact that was carefully recorded by the German security services.⁶⁸ Some of the German reports quote extensively some of the publications. Thus, for example, in one of the brochures published by the OUN-B, the author says that "Germany, which pretends to be an ally and liberator, does not wish to see Ukraine united and independent, she does not wish that a Ukrainian state exists, she wants to turn Ukraine into her colony and the Ukrainian people into slaves".⁶⁹ An article, which appeared in "Bulletin" No. 4 (an OUN-B publication), is reported to have called for an opposition of the Ukrainian people to the German authorities. The article maintained that "communism and fascism are rather similar in their basic objectives, they differ only in tactics".⁷⁰ Analyzing the OUN-B propaganda, the German intelligence report of November 27, 1942 concludes that the leaflets of the Bandera faction are inflammatory, calling for the assassination of Germans, particularly members of the security police.⁷¹

Reading the Ukrainian underground literature as well as the reports of the German security police it becomes quite clear that after September 15, 1941 the OUN-B and, after the Pochaiv Conference of May 24-25, 1942, the OUN-M considered the German authorities enemies of the Ukrainian political aspirations, oppressors and exploiters of the Ukrainian people. This perception of the German authorities was clearly stated in the resolutions of the Third Conference of the OUN-B, which was held on February 17-21, 1943. The previously stated position was reiterated in greater detail stating that Bolsheviks and Nazis fought an imperialist war whose goal was "complete enslavement of nations and individuals...Ukraine", stated the resolution, "found herself at this moment between the hammer and anvil of two hostile imperialists – Moscow and Berlin, who equally consider her [Ukraine] as an object of colonialism".⁷²

The anti-German stance of the Ukrainian underground was echoed particularly in the resolution of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of OUN-B, which was held on August 21 – 25, 1943. The

Grand Assembly, which stands as a landmark of the Ukrainian resistance movement, stated its position clearly when it stated: *The OUN is resolutely fighting against both internationalist and fascist national-socialist programs and political concepts, for they are the tools of imperialist policies of conquest. Thus, we are opposed both to Russian-Bolshevik communism and to German National Socialism.*⁷³ The German authorities recognized the antagonistic nature of the Ukrainian national underground movement and for that reason their police reports, after 1941, introduced the designation “Die Ukrainische Widerstandsbewegung” –The Ukrainian resistance movement.

The Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of the OUN-B was much more than a clear and a determined statement against the policies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Some points of the program, that the Congress adopted, constituted a radical departure from its previous positions. Even the German intelligence reported on September 15, 1943 that, as a result of “the decision of the Congress, the claim of the OUN to exclusive leadership in the Ukrainian affairs was done away with”.⁷⁴ The same report states that “by abandoning its authoritarian character the OUN experienced a fundamental change...Inwardly, the change of the political principals of the OUN, demonstrates a trend to democratic views”.⁷⁵ The report also indicates that the Congress created a central high command of the Ukrainian Resistance Army (UPA) on the All-Ukrainian (“Allukrainertums”) basis without any party affiliation and politically independent from the OUN of Bandera.⁷⁶

The new spirit of the reformed OUN is reflected clearly in the Programmatic Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly. Particularly points 10—12 convey the ideals of democracy and equality, which characterize civil society:

a) *For freedom of the press, speech, thought, convictions, worship and world-view. Against the official imposition on society of any doctrines or dogmas with regard to world-views.*
For freedom to profess and practice any religion which does not run counter to the morals of society.
For the separation of church organizations from the state.
For cultural relations with other nations; for the right of citizens to go abroad for education, medical treatment or in order to learn about the life and cultural achievements of other nations.
For the full right of national minorities to cultivate their own national cultures.
*For equality of all citizens of Ukraine, whatever their nationality, with regard to the right of obligations of citizenship; for equal right of all to work, remuneration and rest.*⁷⁷

From the foregoing it should be obvious that since 1941 serious changes were taking place within the OUN-B, which was conducting a persistent anti-Nazi propaganda that affected not only its members, but the Ukrainian society at large. This, of course, was not merely a war of words – it was a necessary period of psychological and organizational preparation for an open resistance not only against the German rule, but also against the communist regime. The brutal and arbitrary behavior the German authorities and the previous experience with the Soviets played into the hands of the OUN, convincing the desperate population that their only hope was in joining the OUN in order to participate actively in the national resistance movement whose ultimate expression was The Ukrainian Resistance Army known as the UPA.

¹ For the genesis of the OUN movement see: John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, Second edition, Colorado 1980; V. Martynets, *Ukrainske Pidpillia: Vid U.V.O. do O.U.N.*, Winnipeg, Canada 1949; Petro Mirchuk, *Narys Istorii OUN*, vol. I., München 1968; Roman Krychevsky, *OUN v Ukraini – ONZ I ZCH OUN*, New York – Toronto, 1962. pp.4-10; A. Hubersky, V. Andrushchenko, M. Mykhalchenko, *Kultura. Ideolohiya. Osobystist. Metodolohichno-svitohliadny analiz* Kyiv, Znannia Ukrainy, 2002..

² For the OUN rejection of its identification with fascism, Nazism and communism see the official publication of the OUN *Rozbudova Natsii*, Nos.8-9, 1929, p. 262; No. 12 (December) 1929 and Nos. 11-12 (Nov.-Dec. 1931. In his book on Fascism Mussolini wrote: “The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value”.(p.11) Mussolini makes even a clear statement on page 12 where he states: “It is not the nation which generates the State: that is an antiquated naturalistic concept which afforded a basis for XIXth century publicity in favor of national governments. Rather it is the State which creates the nation, conferring volition and therefore real life on a people made aware of their moral unity.” See Mussolini, *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions*. Rome 1935. See also pages 26-27, 30, 40-41.

³ Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919 – 1929*. Columbia University Press, New York 1980, pp. 162 – 166.

⁴ Public Record Office, Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371/19962, doc. 3276, p.6. The entire collection is called “Documents concerning the activities of O.U.N. and U.W.O. among the Ukrainian population of the U.S.A. and Canada also concerning the assistance of the Lithuanian government to Ukrainian terrorists.”

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 10.

⁶ From the private archive of Prof. Gerhard von Mende, director of the Department of “Fremde Völker” in Ostministerium. See his “Die Verbindungen der deutsschen Abwaehr”, pp.1, 16. Copies in authors private archive.

⁷ *Ibid.* pp.2-4.

⁸ Hans Werner Neulen, *An deutscher Seite: Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS*. München 1985, p.306-7; Roman Krokhamliuk, *Zahrava na skhodi: spohady I dokumenty z pratsi u Viiskovii upravli “Halychyna” v 1943-1945 rokakh*. Toronto-New York 1978, pp. 7-9; Karl Abshagen, *Canaris, Patriot und Weltbürger*. Stuttgart 1949, p. 217.

⁹ The tragic feelings of the Ukrainian Nationalists, after they were informed by Major Demel of the Abwehr about the Nazi-Soviet Agreement, is conveyed by Yaroslav Hayvas, who was present at the meeting, in his memoirs *Volia Tsiny ne Maye*. Toronto 1971, pp.225—236.

¹⁰ A.V. Kentii, *Narys Istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv (1929-1941)*. Kyiv 1998, pp.127-135.

¹¹ General Services Administration National Archives and Records Service, T77/1505, General Erwin Lahousen Tagebuch. Pp.95, 97, 98, 99.

¹² *Op. cit.* Lahousen Tagebuch, p. 151. Rittmeister Jary, der seit langem als V-Mann der Abw.II tätig war und sich jetzt als Oberst der DUN und Führer der Gruppe Süd bezeichnet....

- ¹³ *Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv u 1941 – 1942 rokakh*. Nasha Knyhozbirnia, 1953; *U Lavakh Druzhynnykiv: Spohady Uchasnykiv*. Dnver, Colorado, 1982; Lev Shankovskiy, *Pokhdni Hrupy OUN*. München 1958; Wolodymyr Kosyk, *The Third Reich and Ukraine*. New York, 1993. Pp.128-136. For interesting details about “Nachtigall” see also Hermann Raschhofer, *Political Assassination: The Legal Background of the Oberlaender and Stashinsky Cases*. Tuebingen, 1964. Pp.1—46; Werner Brockdorff, *Geheimkommandos des Zweiten Weltkrieges*. Muenchen, 1967. Pp.126 – 138.
- ¹⁴ See Bundesarchiv, NS 43/41. “Memorandum ueber die Ziele der ukrainischen nationalistischen Bewegung von der Führung der ukrainischen Nationalisten”.
- ¹⁵ *OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsiy ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929—1955 r. 1955,n.pl., pp.24-48*; Also “Beschlüsse des II. Kongresses der Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten ___ OUN”. T 120, Roll No. 2533/E292940, E 292943, E 292944.
- ¹⁶ See T 120, Roll No. 2533, E 292922 – 292935.
- ¹⁷ Since this statement casts aside all speculations as to the real objective of the OUN, let me quote the original: “ Wenn auch die deutschen Truppen bei ihrem Einmarsch in die Ukraine selbstverständlich dort zuerst als Befreier begrüsst warden, so wird sich diese Einstellung bald ändern können, falls Deutschland in die Ukraine nicht mit dem Ziel der Wiederherstellung des ukrainischen Staates und den entsprechenden Parolen kommt. See T 120, Roll No. 2533, E 292927.
- ¹⁸ Ibid. E 292935; see also “Denkschrift der Organization Ukrainischer Nationalisten zur Lösung der ukrainischen Frage”, Bundesarchiv, R 43 II/1500, pp. 63-77.
- ¹⁹ Institute für Zeitgeschichte, München, Hans von Herwarth “Deutschland und die ukrainische Frage 1941 – 1945”, 51/Mo 87., p.10. .
- ²⁰ Bundesarchiv, R 43 II/1500, p.62.
- ²¹ Institute fuer Zeitgeschichte, Herwarth, p. 2.
- ²² See Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht: Die Bedeutung der Sowjetunion für die deutsche Wirtschafts – und Rüstungspolitik zwischen den Weltkriegen*. Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1984, pp. 347-348; also John A. Armstrong, “Ukraine: Colony or Partner?” in *German – Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. By Hans-Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka. Edmonton—Toronto, 1994, pp.187 – 199.
- ²³ Roman Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934 – 1945*, Vol. II, Osteuropa – Institut, München 1956, pp.144—147.
- ²⁴ Orest Dziuban, Ed., *Ukrainske Derzhavotvorennia*, Lviv – Kyiv, 2001, pp. 65—66.
- ²⁵ Op. cit., Ilnytzkyj, II, pp.148 – 150.
- ²⁶ For the events preceding the Proclamation of Independence see Yaroslav S. Stetzko, *30 Chervnia 1941: Proholoshennia Vidnovlennia Derzhavnosti Ukrainy*. London 1967, pp.175 – 194.
- ²⁷ Ibid., pp. 197 – 198.
- ²⁸ For a complete text of the Proclamation see: Tsentralny Derzhavnyj Arkhiv Vyshchykh Orhaniv I Upravlinnia Ukrainy (Henceforth TsDAHOU), Fond 3833, opys 1, sprava 5, arkush 3; also *Tysiacha Rokiv Ukrainskoi Suspilno – Politychnoi Dumky*, Kyiv 2001. Vol. VIII, pp. 24-25, and *Samostiyna Ukraina*, Stanyslaviv, 10 lypnia 1941 “Akt Proholoshennia Ukrainskoi Derzhavy”.
- ²⁹ Tsentralny Derzhavny Istorychny Arkhiv Ukrainy u Lvovi. Fond 358, opys 1, zb. No. 18.
- ³⁰ Op. cit. Ilnytzkyj, II. , p. 186
- ³¹ See Bundesarchiv, R58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR. Nr. 11, p.58.
- ³² “Niederschrift über die Rücksprache mit Mitgliedern des ukrainischen Nationalkomitees und Stepan Bandera vom 3.7.1941”, see Hoover Institute on War and Revolution, NSDAP Nr. 52, pp. 7—8.
- ³³ Ibid., p. 10.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p.13.
- ³⁵ Ibid. p.14
- ³⁶ Ibid. p.14.
- ³⁷ Ereignismeldung UdSSR.Nr.10.
- ³⁸ Ibid. Nr.11
- ³⁹ Ibid. Nr. 13 and 15.
- ⁴⁰ Bundesarchiv. R. /150, fol.1, Rücksprache mit Prof. Dr. Koch am 10.7.1941. P.7.
- ⁴¹ Op. cit. Roman Ilnytzkyj, II, pp. 193-194. Also Yaroslav Stetsko, *30 Chervnia 1941*. Toronto, Ontario, 1967, pp.256-260.
- ⁴² Ibid. pp. 187-188 and 272-273 respectively.

- ⁴³ Wolodymyr Kosyk, *Das Dritte Reich und die Ukrainische Frage: Dokumente 1934 – 1944*. München, n.d., pp.84 – 86.
- ⁴⁴ Virtually in every report of the Security Police (SD) references were made about anti-German activities of the followers of Bandera. See Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 52, 56,58, 66, 78, 876.
- ⁴⁵ Bundesarchiv, Koblenz., R58/215. Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 32, pp.19-20. Ukrainian workers in Germany wrote extensive letters to Hitler protesting the German policy in Ukraine, arrest of Bandera and Stetsko and the merging of Galicia with the General Government. The letter of August 25, 1941 was signed by 193 people. For details see Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, R 43 II/1504 b. Pp. 34-40 and 114-115.
- ⁴⁶ Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, R43 II/1340 b “Verordnungsblatt für das Generalgouvernement” For speeches connected with the merger and a copy of an extensive article in the journal *Europäische Revue*(Maim1942), “Das Generalgouvernement in der Neuordnung Europas” see Bundesarchiv-Militär und Abwehr, Freiburg, RH 22/5 and RH 22/6.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid. RH 22/171.
- ⁴⁸ Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, R 43 II /1500
- ⁴⁹ *U Lavakh Druzhynnykiv: Spohady Uchasnykiv*. Denver, 1982, pp. 36-39; 85-100; 115-124;135-143. Also *Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv u 1941 – 1942 rokakh*. 1953, n.pl., pp. 19-22; 37-41; 52-64. See also Liubomyr Ortynsky, “Druzhyny ukrainskykh natsionalistiv (DUN)”, *Visti bratstva kolyshnykh voyakiv I-oi Ukrainskoi dyvizii UNA*, no.6-7 (20-1), 1952.
- ⁵⁰ The National Archives, Washington, D.C., T120/2532. The Ukrainian translation of this document can be found in Taras Hunczak and Roman Solchanyk, eds., *Ukrainska suspilno-poitychna dumka v 20 stolitti: Dokumenty i materialy*. New York, 1983, vol. III, pp. 35-43. Also op.cit. *Tysiacha rokiv ukrainskoi suspilno-politychnoi dumky*, vol. VIII, pp. 37 – 44.
- ⁵¹ Unpublished memoirs of Mykola Lebed, p. 94. Almost identical information can be found on pages 12 and 13 of the 16 –page manuscript in the Petro Sodol personal archive in the “M. Lebed” file. The manuscript provides interesting insight into the events of 1941.
- ⁵² See Bundesarchiv, R58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, Nr.11, pp. 3-4. For a partial record of OUN-B members arrested during the period of 1941-1943, see Bundesarchiv, R58/223, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten Nr. 41; see also The National Archives, Washington, D.C., T175/279; T175/146.
- ⁵³ For personal recollections from these gatherings see, Op. cit. Roman Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine*, vol. II, pp.192-194.
- ⁵⁴ See foot note No. 17.
- ⁵⁵ Wolodymyr Kosyk, *The Third Reich and Ukraine*. New York 1993, p.529-530..
- ⁵⁶ Mykola Lebed, *UPA: Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia* (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946), pp. 16-17.
- ⁵⁷ *OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshkh dokumentiv z borotby 1929—1955 r.* 1955, p.61.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 62-63.
- ⁵⁹ *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem internationalen Militärgerichtshof*. Nürnberg 1949 Vol. XXXIX, pp.265, 269 - 270.
- ⁶⁰ Orders to prevent the establishment of a Ukrainian national state were given also to the German army. The command of the 17th Army repeated the instructions as follows: “Ukrainische politische Selbständigkeits-Bestrebungen im Sinne eines ukrainischen Nationalstaates und Gründung einer ukrainischen Armee im Operationsgebiet zu unterbinden”. The National Archives, Washington, D.C., T312/674/8308426.
- ⁶¹ See *OUN u Vyni* (Information Section of the OUN, 1946), pp. 69—72.
- ⁶² Jaroslav Hajwas, “Na zakrutakh istorii: Stayetsia neperedbachene” in Zynovii Knysh, ed., *Nepohasnyi ohon viry*. Paris, 1974, pp. 269-270.
- ⁶³ The document can be found in Bundesarchiv, R43 II/ 1504 or in The National Archives, Washington, D.C., T454/92/000715. A Ukrainian translation is in Hunczak and Solchanyk, op. cit. vol. III, pp. 44 – 47.
- ⁶⁴ *OUN u Vyni*, op. cit. p. 73.
- ⁶⁵ For details see John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed., Littleton, Col., 1980, pp.106-116.
- ⁶⁶ See *Orhanizatsiya Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv 1929 – 1954*. Paris 1955. Pp. 285—289. Also *Nepohasnyi Ohon Viry*, op.cit., p.72. Also John Armstrong, pp. 272-277 and Jaroslav Hajwas, *Koly Kinchaliasia Epokha*. Na chuzhyni 1964, pp. 78-82.
- ⁶⁷ *Nepohasnyi Ohon Viry*, pp. 272-273. One should note that the Pochaiv Conference took place without the approval of Col. Melnyk. What was probably irritating for Melnyk was the fact that the Conference elected Oles

Olzhych-Kandyba the Deputy-Leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Leader of the Organization for Ukraine. This diminished the authority of Melnyk. Both Melnyk and Olzhych differed in their attitude toward the Germans – while Melnyk still hoped to find a common ground with Berlin, Olzhych was in favor of a radical anti-German policy. See Yuri Kyrychuk, *Ukrainskyi Natsionalnyi Rukh 1940 – 1950 r. XX stolittia: Ideolohiya ta Praktyka*. Lviv 2003, p.97.

⁶⁸ Bundesarchiv, R58/698, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, Nr. 14, p. 83; Nr. 17, pp. 174-175; Nr.18, pp. 183, 193-195.

⁶⁹ Bundesarchiv, R58/223, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, Nr. 37, p. 64.

⁷⁰ The National Archives, Washington, D.C., T175/17/2520098--2520105

⁷¹ Ibid. T175/279/5490778

⁷² *OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, op. cit. pp.75-89.*

⁷³ For details of the Congress, see Ibid. pp. 90-103. Also Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, eds., *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943 – 1951*.Edmonton 1986, pp. 333 –353.

⁷⁴ “Ukrainische Nationalistische Bewegung” in *Litopys Ukrainskoi Povstanskoï Armii*, Vol.6. Editor Taras Hunczak, Toronto 1983, p. 94.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 95.

⁷⁶ Ibid. pp.94, 95.

⁷⁷ Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, op.cit. pp. 342, 345. Also *OUN v svitli postanov...op.cit. pp.90 – 103*; Yuriy Kyrychuk, *Ukrainskyi Natsionalnyi Rukh 40 – 50 rokiv XX stolittia: Ideolohiya I praktyka*. Lviv 2003, pp. 131 – 132; Myroslav Prokop, “U sorokrichchya III Nadzvychaynoho Velykoho Zboru OUN” in *Suchasnist* July – August 1983. Pp.104 – 132.